KVM: SVM: Add support for SEV DEBUG_DECRYPT command
authorBrijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Mon, 4 Dec 2017 16:57:37 +0000 (10:57 -0600)
committerBrijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Mon, 4 Dec 2017 19:33:13 +0000 (13:33 -0600)
The command is used for decrypting a guest memory region for debug
purposes.

Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: "Radim Krčmář" <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
Cc: Joerg Roedel <joro@8bytes.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: x86@kernel.org
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
arch/x86/kvm/svm.c

index f5da275..ec2b864 100644 (file)
@@ -6163,6 +6163,155 @@ e_free:
        return ret;
 }
 
+static int __sev_issue_dbg_cmd(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned long src,
+                              unsigned long dst, int size,
+                              int *error, bool enc)
+{
+       struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &kvm->arch.sev_info;
+       struct sev_data_dbg *data;
+       int ret;
+
+       data = kzalloc(sizeof(*data), GFP_KERNEL);
+       if (!data)
+               return -ENOMEM;
+
+       data->handle = sev->handle;
+       data->dst_addr = dst;
+       data->src_addr = src;
+       data->len = size;
+
+       ret = sev_issue_cmd(kvm,
+                           enc ? SEV_CMD_DBG_ENCRYPT : SEV_CMD_DBG_DECRYPT,
+                           data, error);
+       kfree(data);
+       return ret;
+}
+
+static int __sev_dbg_decrypt(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned long src_paddr,
+                            unsigned long dst_paddr, int sz, int *err)
+{
+       int offset;
+
+       /*
+        * Its safe to read more than we are asked, caller should ensure that
+        * destination has enough space.
+        */
+       src_paddr = round_down(src_paddr, 16);
+       offset = src_paddr & 15;
+       sz = round_up(sz + offset, 16);
+
+       return __sev_issue_dbg_cmd(kvm, src_paddr, dst_paddr, sz, err, false);
+}
+
+static int __sev_dbg_decrypt_user(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned long paddr,
+                                 unsigned long __user dst_uaddr,
+                                 unsigned long dst_paddr,
+                                 int size, int *err)
+{
+       struct page *tpage = NULL;
+       int ret, offset;
+
+       /* if inputs are not 16-byte then use intermediate buffer */
+       if (!IS_ALIGNED(dst_paddr, 16) ||
+           !IS_ALIGNED(paddr,     16) ||
+           !IS_ALIGNED(size,      16)) {
+               tpage = (void *)alloc_page(GFP_KERNEL);
+               if (!tpage)
+                       return -ENOMEM;
+
+               dst_paddr = __sme_page_pa(tpage);
+       }
+
+       ret = __sev_dbg_decrypt(kvm, paddr, dst_paddr, size, err);
+       if (ret)
+               goto e_free;
+
+       if (tpage) {
+               offset = paddr & 15;
+               if (copy_to_user((void __user *)(uintptr_t)dst_uaddr,
+                                page_address(tpage) + offset, size))
+                       ret = -EFAULT;
+       }
+
+e_free:
+       if (tpage)
+               __free_page(tpage);
+
+       return ret;
+}
+
+static int sev_dbg_crypt(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp, bool dec)
+{
+       unsigned long vaddr, vaddr_end, next_vaddr;
+       unsigned long dst_vaddr, dst_vaddr_end;
+       struct page **src_p, **dst_p;
+       struct kvm_sev_dbg debug;
+       unsigned long n;
+       int ret, size;
+
+       if (!sev_guest(kvm))
+               return -ENOTTY;
+
+       if (copy_from_user(&debug, (void __user *)(uintptr_t)argp->data, sizeof(debug)))
+               return -EFAULT;
+
+       vaddr = debug.src_uaddr;
+       size = debug.len;
+       vaddr_end = vaddr + size;
+       dst_vaddr = debug.dst_uaddr;
+       dst_vaddr_end = dst_vaddr + size;
+
+       for (; vaddr < vaddr_end; vaddr = next_vaddr) {
+               int len, s_off, d_off;
+
+               /* lock userspace source and destination page */
+               src_p = sev_pin_memory(kvm, vaddr & PAGE_MASK, PAGE_SIZE, &n, 0);
+               if (!src_p)
+                       return -EFAULT;
+
+               dst_p = sev_pin_memory(kvm, dst_vaddr & PAGE_MASK, PAGE_SIZE, &n, 1);
+               if (!dst_p) {
+                       sev_unpin_memory(kvm, src_p, n);
+                       return -EFAULT;
+               }
+
+               /*
+                * The DBG_{DE,EN}CRYPT commands will perform {dec,en}cryption of the
+                * memory content (i.e it will write the same memory region with C=1).
+                * It's possible that the cache may contain the data with C=0, i.e.,
+                * unencrypted so invalidate it first.
+                */
+               sev_clflush_pages(src_p, 1);
+               sev_clflush_pages(dst_p, 1);
+
+               /*
+                * Since user buffer may not be page aligned, calculate the
+                * offset within the page.
+                */
+               s_off = vaddr & ~PAGE_MASK;
+               d_off = dst_vaddr & ~PAGE_MASK;
+               len = min_t(size_t, (PAGE_SIZE - s_off), size);
+
+               ret = __sev_dbg_decrypt_user(kvm,
+                                            __sme_page_pa(src_p[0]) + s_off,
+                                            dst_vaddr,
+                                            __sme_page_pa(dst_p[0]) + d_off,
+                                            len, &argp->error);
+
+               sev_unpin_memory(kvm, src_p, 1);
+               sev_unpin_memory(kvm, dst_p, 1);
+
+               if (ret)
+                       goto err;
+
+               next_vaddr = vaddr + len;
+               dst_vaddr = dst_vaddr + len;
+               size -= len;
+       }
+err:
+       return ret;
+}
+
 static int svm_mem_enc_op(struct kvm *kvm, void __user *argp)
 {
        struct kvm_sev_cmd sev_cmd;
@@ -6195,6 +6344,9 @@ static int svm_mem_enc_op(struct kvm *kvm, void __user *argp)
        case KVM_SEV_GUEST_STATUS:
                r = sev_guest_status(kvm, &sev_cmd);
                break;
+       case KVM_SEV_DBG_DECRYPT:
+               r = sev_dbg_crypt(kvm, &sev_cmd, true);
+               break;
        default:
                r = -EINVAL;
                goto out;