stackprotector: Increase the per-task stack canary's random range from 32 bits to...
authorDaniel Micay <danielmicay@gmail.com>
Thu, 4 May 2017 13:32:09 +0000 (09:32 -0400)
committerGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Thu, 25 May 2017 13:44:46 +0000 (15:44 +0200)
commitf157261b55a40a5fe38259d1dcc0a9ff30987b3c
tree1de25ab367cc22d1abd72a8bf8d95761c2790ede
parente8a8a6972c5075e6057264c45614d13f9e0307e5
stackprotector: Increase the per-task stack canary's random range from 32 bits to 64 bits on 64-bit platforms

commit 5ea30e4e58040cfd6434c2f33dc3ea76e2c15b05 upstream.

The stack canary is an 'unsigned long' and should be fully initialized to
random data rather than only 32 bits of random data.

Signed-off-by: Daniel Micay <danielmicay@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Arjan van Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170504133209.3053-1-danielmicay@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
kernel/fork.c