ALSA: emux: Fix potential Spectre v1 vulnerabilities
authorGustavo A. R. Silva <gustavo@embeddedor.com>
Wed, 12 Dec 2018 17:20:49 +0000 (11:20 -0600)
committerGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Wed, 9 Jan 2019 16:38:36 +0000 (17:38 +0100)
commiteb734900aa8341ee2d564ac0ab8a207f49e47cd3
treefedb36125b1821b1e51d768f8e49985e5520e4b3
parent56971d62c7591ea6dcec95b92c0762a6d1fa1ba9
ALSA: emux: Fix potential Spectre v1 vulnerabilities

commit 4aea96f4237cea0c51a8bc87c0db31f0f932f1f0 upstream.

info.mode and info.port are indirectly controlled by user-space,
hence leading to a potential exploitation of the Spectre variant 1
vulnerability.

These issues were detected with the help of Smatch:

sound/synth/emux/emux_hwdep.c:72 snd_emux_hwdep_misc_mode() warn: potential spectre issue 'emu->portptrs[i]->ctrls' [w] (local cap)
sound/synth/emux/emux_hwdep.c:75 snd_emux_hwdep_misc_mode() warn: potential spectre issue 'emu->portptrs' [w] (local cap)
sound/synth/emux/emux_hwdep.c:75 snd_emux_hwdep_misc_mode() warn: potential spectre issue 'emu->portptrs[info.port]->ctrls' [w] (local cap)

Fix this by sanitizing both info.mode and info.port before using them
to index emu->portptrs[i]->ctrls, emu->portptrs[info.port]->ctrls and
emu->portptrs.

Notice that given that speculation windows are large, the policy is
to kill the speculation on the first load and not worry if it can be
completed with a dependent load/store [1].

[1] https://marc.info/?l=linux-kernel&m=152449131114778&w=2

Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavo@embeddedor.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
sound/synth/emux/emux_hwdep.c