vfs, fdtable: Prevent bounds-check bypass via speculative execution
authorDan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Tue, 30 Jan 2018 01:03:05 +0000 (17:03 -0800)
committerGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Tue, 13 Feb 2018 11:36:00 +0000 (12:36 +0100)
commitc26ceec69576cb61157d2487812fb2776e125260
tree2bf630b56c5980a9d4fbdd47a4ea98a182a9a2ba
parentc3193fd49f6f0a9b378379f8fd3a95f01172d477
vfs, fdtable: Prevent bounds-check bypass via speculative execution

(cherry picked from commit 56c30ba7b348b90484969054d561f711ba196507)

'fd' is a user controlled value that is used as a data dependency to
read from the 'fdt->fd' array.  In order to avoid potential leaks of
kernel memory values, block speculative execution of the instruction
stream that could issue reads based on an invalid 'file *' returned from
__fcheck_files.

Co-developed-by: Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org
Cc: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com
Cc: gregkh@linuxfoundation.org
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: torvalds@linux-foundation.org
Cc: alan@linux.intel.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/151727418500.33451.17392199002892248656.stgit@dwillia2-desk3.amr.corp.intel.com
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
include/linux/fdtable.h