ecryptfs: fix dereference of NULL user_key_payload
authorEric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Mon, 9 Oct 2017 19:51:27 +0000 (12:51 -0700)
committerGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Thu, 2 Nov 2017 08:49:15 +0000 (09:49 +0100)
commit4b86c486e628e7b4804f279b35ffba096e37f279
treee00b4e4ad7f4356fe81d19cdc5f7ff5ee0909439
parentbdcb6c994c16d5deaff39b6008c0fec10891e4da
ecryptfs: fix dereference of NULL user_key_payload

commit f66665c09ab489a11ca490d6a82df57cfc1bea3e upstream.

In eCryptfs, we failed to verify that the authentication token keys are
not revoked before dereferencing their payloads, which is problematic
because the payload of a revoked key is NULL.  request_key() *does* skip
revoked keys, but there is still a window where the key can be revoked
before we acquire the key semaphore.

Fix it by updating ecryptfs_get_key_payload_data() to return
-EKEYREVOKED if the key payload is NULL.  For completeness we check this
for "encrypted" keys as well as "user" keys, although encrypted keys
cannot be revoked currently.

Alternatively we could use key_validate(), but since we'll also need to
fix ecryptfs_get_key_payload_data() to validate the payload length, it
seems appropriate to just check the payload pointer.

Fixes: 237fead61998 ("[PATCH] ecryptfs: fs/Makefile and fs/Kconfig")
Reviewed-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Cc: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
fs/ecryptfs/ecryptfs_kernel.h
fs/ecryptfs/keystore.c